Dynamic Self-management of Autonomic Systems: The Reputation, Quality and Credibility (RQC) Scheme by Garg, Anurag et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY 
OF TRENTO 
 DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
  
38050 Povo – Trento (Italy), Via Sommarive 14 
http://www.dit.unitn.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DYNAMIC SELF-MANAGEMENT OF  
AUTONOMIC SYSTEMS: THE REPUTATION, 
QUALITY AND CREDIBILITY (RQC) SCHEME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anurag Garg, Roberto Battiti and Gianni Costanzi 
  
 
 
 
 
2004 
 
Technical Report # DIT-04-082 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Dynamic Self-management of Autonomic Systems: The
Reputation, Quality and Credibility (RQC) Scheme
Anurag Garg Roberto Battiti Gianni Costanzi
Dipartimento di Informatica e Telecomunicazioni,
Universita` di Trento,
Via Sommarive 14, 38050 Povo (TN), Italy.
 
garo,battiti  @dit.unitn.it
Abstract. In this paper, we present a feedback-based system for managing trust
and detecting malicious behavior in autonomically behaving networks. The two
crucial insights that motivate our work are the notion of quality of a trust rating
and the recognition as separate entities of the trust placed in a node and of the
trust placed in the recommendations made by a node. These variables allow nodes
to decide how much confidence they can place in the rating. We implement our
scheme on a structured P2P network, Pastry, though our insights can be extended
to unstructured systems and generic autonomic communication systems as well.
Experimental results considering different models for malicious behavior indicate
the contexts in which the RQC scheme has a better performance as compared to
existing schemes in the literature.
Keywords: Trust management, reputation, structured overlays, peer-to-peer sys-
tems.
1 Introduction
Autonomic systems aim at incorporating methods to monitor their dynamic behavior
and to react in automated ways, aiming at self-management and self-improvement. This
work explores how ideas of automated reputation schemes originated in other contexts
(e.g. e-commerce) can be modied and applied for the soft enforcement of rules of
behavior in specic autonomic systems based on distributed control.
In particular, this work proposes a novel scheme to self-manage reputation values
and presents experiments in the area of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. It is known that in
certain application areas P2P systems have benets over the more traditional client-
server architectures. With no centralized administration and no central database or
server, there is no single point of failure. The peers themselves are autonomous and can
join and leave the system at will without adversely affecting service availability. There-
fore, the design of such systems requires them to be self-organizing, self-managing,
self-healing and self-aware.
All autonomic systems implicitly place a certain trust in participants, assuming that
they will follow certain guidelines for fair-use. But due to the distributed nature of
such systems systems, breaking these guidelines can go undetected by the system as a
whole and not result in any signicant penalties to misbehaving users. This can result
in poorer quality of service and, in the worst case, outright service denial.
Examples of such unfair use range from the relatively benign free-riders that
utilize the facilities offered by the network (such as download of les, use of process-
ing power etc.) without contributing back to the network in reasonable measure such as
sharing their own les, processing power or disk space, or forwarding routing requests
from other peers, to more serious abuses such as distributing viruses, intentionally shar-
ing inauthentic or malformed les that cause an unnecessary increase in network trafc,
giving incorrect information in response to queries and manipulating trust management
systems by giving false trust ratings for a peer.
Since P2P systems are usually open and anonymous, imposing barriers for entry
into the system is not always an acceptable solution. Instead, several reputation-based
trust management systems have been proposed. These systems rely on the dissemina-
tion, throughout the network, of trust information gathered through transactions be-
tween peers. In this way peers can build knowledge about peers with whom they have
never interacted before and use this information to decide whether to interact with new
peers. But relying on information from third parties also makes the system vulnerable
to manipulation through false complaints or false praise.
We present a reputation-based system that is robust against false ratings and at the
same time allows good nodes to avoid interacting with malicious nodes a large
proportion of the time. We simulate our trust management scheme on Pastry [1], a
structured overlay network that uses distributed hash tables for routing. Using Pastry,
we assign one or more Score Managers (SM) to each node and all transaction involving
that node are reported to each of these score managers. The score managers aggregate
trust information and respond to rating requests by nodes wishing to transact with a
node for whose trust ratings they are responsible.
Our system provides nodes with a mechanism to specify a quality value for trust
ratings they submit to score managers, usually based on the number, variation and the
scope of the interactions they have had with the node they are rating. Similarly, score
managers also attach a quality value to the ratings they provide to other nodes. This
allows nodes to set their own standards of rating quality which must be met for an
interaction to happen.
We also distinguish between the reputation of a node and its credibility as a re-
porter of other nodes’ ratings. For example, consider a decentralized system for ranking
restaurants. It is possible that a restaurant may serve very good food but it falsely rates
other restaurants as bad to prevent prospective clients from going there. Therefore this
restaurant should have a high reputation but low credibility.
The paper therefore contributes to the understanding of how trust information should
be aggregated and how much credence should be attached to it by other nodes in the
network. Together, the three variables Reputation (R), Quality (Q) and Credibility (C)
provide a richer and more robust trust management system and we call our scheme the
RQC scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review existing
work on trust management in P2P systems. In Sec. 3 we present our solution. In Sec. 4
we present our experimental results and we conclude in Sec. 5.
2 Related Work
Initial efforts at trust management in electronic communities were based on central-
ized trust databases. The eBay rating system used for choosing trading partners where
each participant in a transaction can vote ( 	
 ) on their counterpart, the Amazon
customer review system and the Slashdot self-moderation of posts [2] are all systems
where the ratings are provided by nodes but are stored in a central database. Many
such reputation systems have been studied in the context of online communities and
marketplaces [35].
In true P2P environments, the storage of trust ratings also needs to be done in a
distributed fashion. Aberer and Despotovic introduced such a scheme [6] using a de-
centralized storage system P-Grid to store and retrieve trust information. Peers can le
complaints against each other if they feel the node has behaved maliciously. All in-
teractions pertaining to a given node, i.e. complaints made by and complaints about
that node, are stored at other nodes called agents. The mechanism is made robust by
keeping copies of reports at several agents and by making sure that agents do not know
the identity of the node whose information is being stored. A node then sends mes-
sages querying trustworthiness of the node with which it wishes to interact to random
nodes in the network. These are then routed to appropriate agents. Two algorithms are
described to compute the trustworthiness. The rst relies on a simple majority of the
reporting agents’ decisions and the second checks the trustworthiness of the reporting
agents themselves and disallows any reports coming from untrustworthy agents.
Cornelli, Damiani et. al. [7, 8] propose a mechanism built on the Gnutella network,
where a node uses a secure polling mechanism to ask its neighbors about interactions
they may have had with a specic node to gauge it’s trustworthiness. The scope of
the messages querying trust is limited by the Gnutella architecture design. Their work
is directed at le-sharing networks and the objective is to nd the most trusted peer
that possesses a given resource and they focus on vote aggregation, incorporating voter
credibility and on ensuring the integrity of trust reports as they pass over the insecure
network.
Kamvar et. al. [9] use a different approach in that trust is assumed to be transitive.
Therefore, a node weighs the trust ratings it receives from other nodes by the trust
it places in the reporting nodes themselves. Global trust values are then computed in a
distributed fashion using a trust matrix at each node with successive iterations involving
exchange of trust values with neighbors and recomputation of the matrix. Trust values
asymptotically approach the eigenvalue of the trust matrix, conditional on the presence
of pre-trusted peers that are always trusted regardless of performance. Their objective
is to reduce the number of inauthentic le downloads and therefore free-riding is in fact
rewarded.
Buchegger et. al. [10] propose a modied Bayesian approach to trust. Like Damiani
et. al. they separate a node’s reputation (it’s performance in the base system such as
le-sharing, routing etc.) and it’s credibility (it’s performance in the reputation system).
In their solution only information on rst-hand experiences is published by nodes. This
is used by nodes to construct their reputation and credibility (called trust by them) data
structures for other nodes. They also age reputation data giving less weight to evidence
received in the past.
3 The RQC (Reputation, Quality, and Credibility) Approach
In our approach we assume existence of a distributed routing mechanism that consis-
tently maps an identier to a logical key space. For our experiments, we use the Pastry
P2P substrate that implements a structured overlay network using distributed hash ta-
bles (DHT). While such a mechanism is not essential, it greatly increases the robustness
of our system against false reports and against certain kinds of attacks.
The trust information pertaining to a node  is stored at  score managers that are
assigned using a DHT. A hashing function is used to map a persistent node identier to
a point in the key space. The  nodes that are closest to this point are then used as score
managers for that node. A node  can then query all the  score managers in order to
compute the reputation of  and decide whether to interact with  .
3.1 Node Opinions
Each node  maintains an opinion  of the behavior of all other nodes  with which
it has interacted in a local data structure.  is node  ’s estimate, through st-hand
experience, of the probability that a node  will behave honestly in the base system and
can take any value ranging from  to  .
Along with the opinion on behavior, a node also stores the number of interactions
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it has had with a given node as well as the variance ﬁﬃﬂ ﬀ in opinion over the en-
tire history of interactions. These two values act as an indicator of the quality a node
attaches to its opinion of a given node. This allows us to capture the notion that an opin-
ion is of greater quality when the number of observations on which it is based is larger
and when the interactions have been consistent (indicated by a smaller variance). When
the number of observations is high but they do not agree with each other, the quality
value is lower. Thus redundancy is inferred from consensus which in turn provides us
with a higher level of condence.
The quality value of an opinion is computed by using the Student’s  distribution.
We assume that a node behavior is normally distributed with some actual trust rating as
the mean and some unknown variance in the node’s behavior. The observations made
through a node’s interactions are then a random sample drawn from the behavior dis-
tribution and we only know the sample mean and sample variance. In reality, since the
node’s rating is restricted to the range  	!!" , we make appropriate modications in our
calculations to take this into account. The quality value indicates the probability that the
actual mean of the node’s behavior lies within #%$ of the observed mean. The  -value is
given by:
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where )* is the mean observed rating, 0 is the sample standard deviation and - is the
number of interactions node  has had with node  . The resulting  is used to compute
the quality value such that
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After each interaction, both participating nodes report their updated opinions to the
score managers responsible for their counterpart. Along with the opinion, the node also
sends the associated quality value. The inclusion of quality indicator in the message
sent to the score manager (SM) allows the SM to gauge the how much condence the
node itself places in the rating it has sent.
3.2 Score Managers
A score manager (SM) receives trust opinions from nodes that interact with all of the
nodes for which it is responsible. The individual opinions are then aggregated to form
the reputation of a node. The score managers therefore represent the global view of a
given node’s behavior.
On average, each SM stores the ratings for  nodes since there are  SMs per
node. A SM uses these opinions to compute a global reputation rating for each node it
is responsible for.
Like an ordinary node a SM also computes and stores an associated quality value
for each of these reputations. However, unlike individual nodes that compute quality
values using the number and variance of interactions, a SM computes quality taking
into account number of reporting nodes, the quality values associated with the opinions
and the variance in the reported opinions.
A SM uses the quality value sent by a reporting node as well as the credibility of
the reporting node to compute the average reputation of a node.
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where
@
BA3CEIJ is the aggregated reputation of node  according to the SM, G BA3CE7
is the credibility of node  according to the SM, IJ is the opinion about  reported
by  and
2
 is the associated quality value. This allows a SM to give more weight
to ratings that are considered high quality and that come from nodes whose judgment
is more credible.
The credibility value indicates the trust the SM has in the judgment and/or honesty
of the reporting node as a player in the reputation system. The SM stores the credibility
rating for each node that sends it an opinion. The credibility rating is updated every time
a node reports an opinion. In addition, when the SM updates the credibility of a node
it uses the quality value furnished by the node to decide the amount of modication in
the trust value. This is because a node should not be penalized for an incorrect opinion
that was based on a small number of interactions where this was explicitly mentioned
through a low quality rating.
When a node reports an opinion to a SM for the rst time, it’s credibility is set to
	MON . Thereafter, every time it reports an opinion on any of the nodes the score manager
is responsible for, it’s credibility is adjusted according to the following formula:
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where ﬁ'BADCE is the standard deviation in the reported opinions about node  . In
this way the credibility of a node remains between  and  and indicates the level of
agreement of the nodes opinions with the aggregated consensus. A node with a lower
credibility value therefore contributes less to the aggregated reputation at the SM than
a node with high credibility.
3.3 Retrieval of Trust Information
When a node wishes to learn the reputation of another node (e.g. to interact with another
node in the system that it has never interacted with), it locates the SMs for the node
using the DHT substrate and asks them for the reputation of the node in question. Each
SM responds with a reputation value and an associated quality value. The node then
computes the average reputation for the node in question using the quality values and
the credibility values of the SMs themselves since a SM may also be malicious and send
the wrong reputation values.
As in the case of the reputation aggregation at the SMs, the node aggregates the
responses and then updates the credibility values of the responding SMs. In this way, if
a SM is malicious, it’s credibility rating is gradually reduced when it’s opinion does not
match that of other SMs.
3.4 Node Classification
As compared to other trust management systems our approach gives a node more in-
formation on which to base its classication of another node as malicious or not. A
querying node receives both the reputation values and the associated quality values
from the respondent. While we outline a method in the previous section where reputa-
tion is aggregated using a weighted average of the reported reputations, it is possible
to implement other strategies as well. For instance, SMs may decide to ignore opinions
with associated quality values below a certain threshold or from nodes with credibility
below a certain threshold.
Similarly, if a node wants stricter guarantees of another node’s good intent, it can
insist on a high reputation as well as a high associated quality value implying consensus
among other nodes that the node in question indeed has a high reputation.
4 Experimental Results
As we mentioned in the introduction, we use the Pastry substrate to implement and
test our reputation algorithm. We assume that the nodes are always online and full
connectivity in the network. We also assume that no messages are dropped and that
messages cannot be spoofed or altered in any way. Since Pastry is written in Java, we
decided to implement our reputation system in Java as well.
In the experiments we describe, we simulated a network of \.. nodes unless spec-
ied otherwise. In each experiment, N... random interactions were performed unless
specied otherwise(i.e. each node has an average of N] interactions). Both the partici-
pants of each interaction are chosen randomly. The default number of score managers
storing reputation ratings for each node was ^ unless specied otherwise.
We simulate two different kinds of maliciousness. A node can be malicious in the
base system, i.e., behave maliciously when interacting with other nodes and/or it may
be malicious in the reputation system. In the latter case, the node behaves maliciously
in its capacity as a SM and sends incorrect reputation values to requesting nodes. A
node can therefore act maliciously in its capacity as a peer, as a SM or both.
We also simulate probabilistic maliciousness where a node does not act maliciously
all the time and is malicious with a probability _a` which is a parameter to the sim-
ulation. Finally, we simulate several scenarios where the number of malicious nodes
ranges from 5% of the total population to 90% of the total population.
We now evaluate the performance of our system for a variety of threat models. The
metric of interest is the number of correct decisions made (i.e., interactions with good
peers that went ahead plus interactions with malicious peers that were avoided) as a
proportion of the total number of decisions made. So, an interaction with a malicious
peer counts against the RQC scheme as much as when an interaction with a good node
is prevented due to false ratings. Since, we are interested in the steady state performance
of the system, the initial interactions that take place when the reputations of nodes have
not been built yet are not counted. In our experiments with N... total interactions
we found that this number ranged from N.. to ^. . So after about ^. interactions,
enough reputation information was generated for good peers to make decisions about
interacting with other peers.
4.1 Maliciousness in Base System
In this experiment we examine how the fraction of malicious peers in the network af-
fects the percentage of correct decisions. Maliciousness in this experiment is dened as
malicious behavior during interactions with other peers. So if a good and a malicious
peer interact they both give each other an opinion of  . Two good peers or two malicious
peers will give each other a value of  after interacting.
Figure 1 depicts the results. As we can see, our scheme performs very well until
the percentage of malicious peers approaches bJJ$ . At this point the dominant ethic of
the system becomes that of the malicious peers and the the good peers are shut out of
the system. It is worth noting that this switchover in the dominant ethic happens when
malicious peers form bJ$ of the total peers and not N]$ . We believe this is because we
count interactions initiated by malicious peers as well and include interactions between
two malicious peers in our count of decisions. As a result the percentage of correct
decisions is lower than expected.
We compared the performance of our scheme against our implementation of the
trust management scheme proposed by Aberer and Despotovic in [6]. We implemented
their scheme in Pastry and ran experiments with the same number of nodes and interac-
tions as in our scheme ( \.. and N... respectively). However, unlike the simulations
they performed, we did not make trust assessments at the end of the interaction period
but instead made trust assessments before each interaction. We feel this model is closer
to reality as nodes would want to know the nature of a node before interacting with
it instead of waiting for a requisite number of interactions to nish. As we can see in
Fig. 1, our scheme performs much better than the Aberer-Despotovic scheme in terms
of the proportion of correct decisions made when the proportion of malicious nodes in
the population is under cJN$ .
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the RQC Scheme with the Aberer-Despotovic Scheme
4.2 Maliciousness in the Reputation System
In Fig. 2, we depict the performance of our scheme for different kinds of malicious
behavior. The three lines represent the cases when malicious nodes behave maliciously
as participants in the base system (i.e., when interacting with other nodes), as partici-
pants of the reputation system (i.e., sending false reputations in their capacity as score
managers) and as participants in both the base and reputation system.
Since all nodes report opinions to and receive reputations from score managers, we
dene malicious behavior in reputation system only in the context of score managers.
A malicious score manager sends a reputation value that is the inverse of the actual ( 
minus the actual) reputation value of the nodes it is responsible for. We assume that
malicious nodes are not aware of each others existence and therefore malicious score
managers do not treat other malicious nodes any different from other nodes.
The most striking feature of Fig. 2 is that the performance of our scheme goes down
and then rises again in both the cases where nodes act maliciously in the reputation
system. This is because with malicious score managers, a large number of interactions
good nodes are avoided contributing to poorer performance. However, as the proportion
of good nodes decreases in the network, an ever increasing number of interactions that
are avoided are with malicious nodes leading to a higher performance value. As an
illustration, when the fraction of nodes behaving maliciously in the reputation system is
d
J$ , only 
c of the N]. interactions are executed and the rest are all avoided. And
since d J$ of these avoided interactions were with malicious nodes, the performance of
the RQC scheme is almost d $ .
When the nodes act maliciously both as participants in the base system and in the
reputation system a similar pattern is observed with the worst performance coming
when the fraction of malicious nodes is %M Q N . This is because as the number of malicious
nodes increases, a larger proportion of interactions take place between two malicious
nodes. These nodes give each other an opinion rating of  but when this opinion is
reported to the score manager  which itself has a high likelihood of being malicious
 it inverts this rating and the reputation of the malicious nodes is correctly reduced
to  . Therefore, a large number of interactions with malicious nodes are avoided, thus
improving the performance of our system.
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Fig. 2. Performance of the RQC Scheme with Different types of Malicious Nodes
4.3 Probabilistic Cheating
In Fig. 3 we examine the case when the malicious nodes do not cheat all the time
but instead cheat with a certain probability. In this experiment, 
$ of the nodes are
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Fig. 3. Performance of the RQC Scheme with Probabilistic Cheating
malicious. We see that the proportion of correct decisions is not affected very much
by the probabilistic cheat patterns of malicious nodes and the proportion of correct
decisions ranges between d J$ and 
.$ .
4.4 Number of Score Managers
In this experiment we study the impact that the number of score managers have on the
decision making process. Figure 4 shows the performance of the RQC scheme when
c.J$ of the nodes are malicious and they act maliciously both in the reputation and the
base system. Surprisingly, the number of score managers makes no difference to the
performance. This is perhaps due to the fact that the score managers themselves are
selected from the population at random and the proportion of score managers that are
malicious remains the same regardless of their actual number.
4.5 Number of Nodes
Figure 5 shows how the RQC scheme scales as the number of nodes in the network
increases. We ran our simulation with the fraction of malicious nodes at \J$ , acting
maliciously only in the base system. We ran the experiment with 
 , Q  , N]. , 
.
and Q . nodes. In each case, the total number of interaction in the experiment was N]
times the total number of nodes.
We nd that the scheme scales well and the performance of the RQC scheme re-
mains more or less constant with the fraction of correct decisions being 	M d.d as the
number of nodes in the system increases.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the RQC scheme for trust management in autonomic
systems. Our scheme computes node Reputations(R), Quality(Q) of rating and node
Credibility(C) to provide a richer trust management system that lends itself to a wide
variety of self-management tasks.
We simulate the RQC scheme using Pastry, a P2P substrate written in Java. How-
ever, the RQC scheme can be easily adapted to other environments. The RQC scheme
is exible enough to allow for trust ratings other than  or  . Moreover, the scheme
emphasizes consensus as an important indicator of the condence that can be placed in
a rating. This along with the number of interactions forms the basis of the quality of a
rating.
The credibility of a node is dependent on the amount by which it’s opinion of a
node (or the reputation it furnishes in case of a score manager) deviates from the mean
reputation of the node in question. In [10] the credibility of a node is lowered if it’s
opinion deviates from the mean reputation by more than a constant e . The RQC scheme
lowers credibility if the opinion deviates from the mean reputation by more than the
sample standard deviation. This does not penalize nodes by lowering their credibility
when they report on a node that behaves erratically. The credibility is also predicated on
the quality value of the opinion/reputation furnished by a node/score manager. A node
should not be penalized as much for an opinion in which it does not have very much
condence.
Our simulation shows that the RQC method performs very well when the number of
malicious nodes in the system is under Q N$ . It signicantly outperforms our implemen-
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Fig. 5. Performance scaling with Number of Nodes in System
tation of the Aberer-Despotovic scheme. The scheme continues to work well when the
malicious nodes cheat in a probabilistic fashion instead of cheating all the time. Finally,
the simulation also shows that the scheme scales well with the number of nodes.
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